We develop a new false-name-proof double auction protocol called the Generalized Threshold Price Double auction (GTPD) protocol. False-name-proofness generalizes strategyproofness...
This paper presents a method for designing bundles in a combinatorial auction protocol that is robust against false-name bids. Internet auctions have become an integral part of El...
This paper presents a new ascending-price multi-unit auction protocol. As far as the authors are aware, this is the first protocol that has an open format, and in which sincere b...
—Online spectrum auctions offer ample flexibility for bidders to request and obtain spectrum on-the-fly. Such flexibility, however, opens up new vulnerabilities to bidder mani...
Lara B. Deek, Xia Zhou, Kevin C. Almeroth, Haitao ...
We use techniques from sample-complexity in machine learning to reduce problems of incentive-compatible mechanism design to standard algorithmic questions, for a broad class of re...
Maria-Florina Balcan, Avrim Blum, Jason D. Hartlin...