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» A New Derandomization of Auctions
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ATAL
2003
Springer
13 years 11 months ago
A false-name-proof double auction protocol for arbitrary evaluation values
We develop a new false-name-proof double auction protocol called the Generalized Threshold Price Double auction (GTPD) protocol. False-name-proofness generalizes strategyproofness...
Yuko Sakurai, Makoto Yokoo
IJCAI
2001
13 years 9 months ago
Bundle Design in Robust Combinatorial Auction Protocol against False-name Bids
This paper presents a method for designing bundles in a combinatorial auction protocol that is robust against false-name bids. Internet auctions have become an integral part of El...
Makoto Yokoo, Yuko Sakurai, Shigeo Matsubara
SIGECOM
2003
ACM
97views ECommerce» more  SIGECOM 2003»
14 years 23 days ago
A robust open ascending-price multi-unit auction protocol against false-name bids
This paper presents a new ascending-price multi-unit auction protocol. As far as the authors are aware, this is the first protocol that has an open format, and in which sincere b...
Atsushi Iwasaki, Makoto Yokoo, Kenji Terada
INFOCOM
2011
IEEE
12 years 11 months ago
To preempt or not: Tackling bid and time-based cheating in online spectrum auctions
—Online spectrum auctions offer ample flexibility for bidders to request and obtain spectrum on-the-fly. Such flexibility, however, opens up new vulnerabilities to bidder mani...
Lara B. Deek, Xia Zhou, Kevin C. Almeroth, Haitao ...
JCSS
2008
138views more  JCSS 2008»
13 years 7 months ago
Reducing mechanism design to algorithm design via machine learning
We use techniques from sample-complexity in machine learning to reduce problems of incentive-compatible mechanism design to standard algorithmic questions, for a broad class of re...
Maria-Florina Balcan, Avrim Blum, Jason D. Hartlin...