Sciweavers

41 search results - page 7 / 9
» Competitive auctions and digital goods
Sort
View
ATAL
2003
Springer
15 years 9 months ago
A false-name-proof double auction protocol for arbitrary evaluation values
We develop a new false-name-proof double auction protocol called the Generalized Threshold Price Double auction (GTPD) protocol. False-name-proofness generalizes strategyproofness...
Yuko Sakurai, Makoto Yokoo
169
Voted
SODA
2008
ACM
109views Algorithms» more  SODA 2008»
15 years 7 months ago
Auctions for structured procurement
This paper considers a general setting for structured procurement and the problem a buyer faces in designing a procurement mechanism to maximize profit. This brings together two a...
Matthew Cary, Abraham D. Flaxman, Jason D. Hartlin...
FOCS
2005
IEEE
15 years 11 months ago
Mechanism Design via Machine Learning
We use techniques from sample-complexity in machine learning to reduce problems of incentive-compatible mechanism design to standard algorithmic questions, for a wide variety of r...
Maria-Florina Balcan, Avrim Blum, Jason D. Hartlin...
144
Voted
ICMAS
1998
15 years 7 months ago
Emergent Properties of a Market-based Digital Library with Strategic Agents
The University of Michigan Digital Library (UMDL) is an open system that allows third-parties to build and integrate their own profit-seeking agents into the marketplace of inform...
Sunju Park, Edmund H. Durfee, William P. Birmingha...
SIGECOM
2010
ACM
156views ECommerce» more  SIGECOM 2010»
15 years 10 months ago
Robust mechanisms for risk-averse sellers
The existing literature on optimal auctions focuses on optimizing the expected revenue of the seller, and is appropriate for risk-neutral sellers. In this paper, we identify good ...
Mukund Sundararajan, Qiqi Yan