We develop a new false-name-proof double auction protocol called the Generalized Threshold Price Double auction (GTPD) protocol. False-name-proofness generalizes strategyproofness...
This paper considers a general setting for structured procurement and the problem a buyer faces in designing a procurement mechanism to maximize profit. This brings together two a...
Matthew Cary, Abraham D. Flaxman, Jason D. Hartlin...
We use techniques from sample-complexity in machine learning to reduce problems of incentive-compatible mechanism design to standard algorithmic questions, for a wide variety of r...
Maria-Florina Balcan, Avrim Blum, Jason D. Hartlin...
The University of Michigan Digital Library (UMDL) is an open system that allows third-parties to build and integrate their own profit-seeking agents into the marketplace of inform...
Sunju Park, Edmund H. Durfee, William P. Birmingha...
The existing literature on optimal auctions focuses on optimizing the expected revenue of the seller, and is appropriate for risk-neutral sellers. In this paper, we identify good ...