Abstract. We present a formalism for the analysis of key-exchange protocols that combines previous definitional approaches and results in a definition of security that enjoys som...
A definition of secure multi-party key exchange in the Canetti-Krawczyk proof model is proposed, followed by a proof of the security of the Joux tripartite key agreement protocol...
Yvonne Hitchcock, Colin Boyd, Juan Manuel Gonz&aac...
Abstract. An unresolved problem in research on authenticated key exchange (AKE) is to construct a secure protocol against advanced attacks such as key compromise impersonation and ...
Cryptographic protocol design in a two-party setting has often ignored the possibility of simultaneous message transmission by each of the two parties (i.e., using a duplex channe...
Password-based protocols for authenticated key exchange (AKE) are designed to work despite the use of passwords drawn from a space so small that an adversary might well enumerate, ...