For the problem of allocating one or more items among a group of competing agents, the Vickrey-Clarke-Groves (VCG) mechanism is strategy-proof and efficient. However, the VCG mech...
This paper studies the properties of the continuous double auction trading mechanishm using an artificial market populated by heterogeneous computational agents. In particular, we...
A key lesson learned from economic and game theory research is that negotiation protocols have substantial, rippling effects on the overall nature of the system. online auctions a...
In this paper, we propose a probabilistic model to study the interaction of bidder and seller agents in sequential automated auctions. We consider a designated “special bidder”...
We study auction-like algorithms for the distributed allocation of tasks to cooperating agents. To reduce the team cost of sequential single-item auction algorithms, we generalize...
Sven Koenig, Craig A. Tovey, Xiaoming Zheng, Ilgaz...